Soviet Military Doctrine : Under Khrushchev

Nikita Khrushchev

Khrushchev's Era (1954-64)
Freed from the stupefying control of Stalin, military doctrine changed significantly under Khrushchev. The major doctrinal trend was to adopt the new nuclear weapons, missile technology, and means of conflict to the old views and concepts of future war. Khrushchev dropped the idea of the inevitability of war between socialism and capitalism. He did not see war as a protracted affair between massed conventional ground forces in Europe. 

Evolution of Soviet Military Doctrine: Under Stalin

Joseph Stalin

Soviet military doctrine changed because of changes in the same complex interrelationships that formed it international political and military environments, foreign military doctrines, history, technology, ideology, and internal political, social moral, and economic constraints. The perceived strategic imbalance has been the prime motivator in the Soviets doctrinal evolution. 

Soviet Military Doctrine

Soviet Military Doctrine
Military doctrine is the system of views that a state holds at a given time on the purpose and character of war, on the preparation of the country and the armed forces for it, and also on the methods of waging it. Military doctrine has two aspects: the political and the military-technical. The former sets out the political purposes and character of war and the way in which these affect the development of the armed forces and the preparation of the country for war. The military-technical aspect deals with the methods of waging war, an organization of the armed forces, their technical equipment, and combat readiness.

Sleep of the Saved

Winston Churchill

While the United States was still reeling over the growing number of casualties and the destruction some of its mightiest battleships, Churchill saw an opportunity. The early years of World War II had been incredibly difficult for England, as Germany proved to be a brutal foe. The Nazis seemed unstoppable and the British forces weren’t far from defeat.

Clausewitz: On War (Part-2)

Clausewitz: On War

The political object of war
The political object of the war had been rather overshadowed by the law of extremes, the will to overcome the enemy and make him powerless. But as this law begins to lose its force and as this determination wanes, the political aim will reassert itself. If it is all a calculation of probabilities based on given individuals and conditions, the political object, which was the original motive, must become an essential factor in the equation. The smaller the penalty

Clausewitz: On War (Part-1)

If one looks closely he will find that War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance.

Clausewitz definition of warWar is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.
Force, to counter opposing force, equips itself with the inventions of art and science. Attached to force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it.