Principles of War

The Principles of War are the principles expressing the rules of military thought and actions that serve as the permanent basis for combat doctrine. The application of the Principles of War differs at different levels and for different operations. Their relative importance can be expected to vary from event to event.


The Principles of War are the principles expressing the rules of military thought and actions that serve as the permanent basis for combat doctrine.
The list of principles is a methodological tool that differs from army to army and from era to era. While the principles remain the same, the list morphs according to time and place, with application always dependent on context.


Deterrence Theory

Deterrence theory gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons. It took on a unique connotation during this time as an inferior nuclear force, by virtue of its extreme destructive power, could deter a more powerful adversary, provided that this force could be protected against destruction by a surprise attack. Deterrence is a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started or to prevent them from doing something that another state desires.

National Power: Meaning, Nature, Dimensions and Methods

National Power is the ability or capability of a nation to secure the goals and objectives of its national interests in relation to other nations. It involves the capacity to use force or threat of use of force or influence over others for securing the goals of national interest.

Meaning of National Power

One can understand the meaning of National Power by first analyzing the meaning and nature of power:


What is Power?
It is not easy to explain the meaning of ‘Power’, more particularly in the context of human relations.We are encountered with many different explanations in various disciplines. Even within a single social discipline, Power is defined in several different ways.
Some social scientists define it as the use of force whereas many others explain it as the capacity to secure the desired goals through the use of force or threat of use of force or even by exercising influence.

A.T. Mahan & The Influence of Sea Power Upon History

A.T. Mahan
A.T.Mahan

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, written by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and published in 1890, was a groundbreaking study that explained how the British Empire rose to power. An expert and lecturer in the field, Mahan was also the President of the U.S. Naval War College. His book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, proved influential not only because of what it said but also because of the impression it made on leaders ranging from American presidents to the German Kaiser.


From 1865 to 1885, commerce raiding and coastal defense were the accepted strategies of the U.S. Navy. In an age of technological change, these ideas began to seem obsolete to an influential group of American naval leaders. RADM Stephen B. Luce established the Naval War College in 1884. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan was assigned there. Mahan's lecture notes become the basis for his book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, published in 1890. The book brought Mahan fame in his lifetime and ever since.
In the context of late 19th Century during times of peace as well as war. This had understandable appeal to industrialists, merchants interested in the overseas trade, investors, nationalists, and imperialists, and peacetime America. Mahan provided a powerful argument for achieving and preserving sea power.

The decline of the U.S. Navy ended about 1880, and by 1890, a renaissance was in full swing. The dominant evidence was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan's book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660- 1763 (1890). Equally significant were the new battleships utilizing Mahan's strategy of command of the sea and clearly displaying the industrial maturation of the United States.
US Naval Fleet during WW2
US Naval Fleet during WW2

The essence of Mahan from a naval viewpoint is that a great navy is a mark and prerequisite of national greatness. A great navy is one designed to fight an enemy in fleet engagements in order to win command of the sea, not one designed for commerce raiding or guerre de course. Mahan said strategic principles "remain as though laid on a rock." Geopolitical principles underlying national (and maritime) greatness: Geographic position; Physical conformation; Extent of territory; Number of the population; Character of the people; Character of the government. Tactics were conditioned by changing types of naval armaments. Tactics were aspects of operations occurring after the beginning of combat.

While Mahan recognized clearly that tactics were fluid due to changes in armaments, he did not view strategy in the same way. He did not realize the extent to which technology would affect, for instance, the validity of some of his six elements of sea power. Mahan was strongly influenced, as were most army officers of the period, by the writings of Jomini, a Swiss writer on strategy in Napoleon's campaigns. Jomini's work depended heavily on fixed principles that could be stated with mathematical precision and comprehensiveness.

Mahan identifies some important "strategic questions":
USS Ohio (BB 12)  passing the Cucaracha Slide,  while transiting the Panama Canal
USS Ohio (BB 12)
passing the Cucaracha Slide,
while transiting the Panama Canal

⇛ What are navies' functions? What are their objectives? 
Answer: "To command the seas" 

⇛ How should navies be concentrated? 
Answer: In battle fleets. 

⇛ Where should the coaling stations need to support them be established? 
Answer: At geographic "choke points" (e.g. Capetown, Hawaii). 

⇛ What is the value of commerce destruction, and should this be a primary or secondary goal of naval action? 
Answer: It cannot win wars, e.g., the C.S.S. Alabama; it can only be a secondary goal of naval action.



Mahan perceived colonies as valuable locations for coaling stations for a steam-driven battleship Navy. Mahan viewed the possibility of an isthmus passage (later to be realized in the form of Panama Canal) as necessary for U.S. naval power since this would become by definition a critical maritime "choke-point" -- the U.S. Navy is a "two-ocean" Navy.

Key Points
As one of the top naval warfare experts in the United States, Mahan understood just how much technological change had occurred in the naval world over time. To make his points, he focused primarily on the period of 1660 to 1783, a time of comparatively little change in technology, but great change in naval power. 
According to Mahan, Great Britain's economic, military and political strength was the direct result of its naval strength: Great Britain maintained both a combat fleet and a merchant fleet. In fact, the merchant capabilities were just as important, as they provided wealth and means of supply. To illustrate that a country was only as powerful as its sea forces, especially in regard to colonialism, Mahan discussed some of the major maritime wars that took place in the Caribbean, Europe, and North America.

Captain Mahan also cited some of the key factors associated with sea power, including a country's geography, government, national character, and population. Communication and concentration of a fleet were also important to naval strength. Additionally, Mahan emphasized how naval strategies of the past could be used in the present. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History not only helped to inspire America's naval renaissance and our nation's foreign policy, but also an international naval race.

Mahan's Vision
Mahan's core argument was that a great navy was essential for national prosperity through military and economic expansion. Mahan saw sea power as thoroughly intertwined with war. He wrote: 'The history of sea power is large, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war.'

His book pulled largely from European history to demonstrate his point. His vision called for a string of worldwide naval bases and coaling stations to patrol the seas. He particularly argued for the concentration of strategic 'choke points' or places where the U.S. could have a concentration of naval strength and supply stations.

As part of his strategy, he argued for a Central American canal and supported the annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines. He also argued that naval battles would be decided by 'decisive battles' between large-scale surface ships such as battleships. One limitation of Mahan's is that he did not foresee the eventual role that submarines and aircraft carriers would play in naval contests.

Mahan's Six Elements
Mahan put great faith in a military buildup. He wrote: 'Organized force alone enables the quiet and the weak to go about their business and sleep securely in their beds, safe from the violent without or within.'
Mahan's vision did not simply rest with naval ships. He argued that there were six elements of naval warfare. 
  • First, is the geographical location, or a nation's proximity to the sea. 
  • Second, is physical conformation, or its access to the ocean through rivers, lakes, harbors, and ports. 
  • Third, is the physical layout of its coastline. 
  • Fourth, is the size of a nation's population. 
  • Fifth is the national character of its people and its attitude toward commerce and trade. Lastly, is the character of the government and its relationship with the military. Mahan's point was that naval success was rooted in physical and non-physical factors and required more than mere ships.

The Economics of War

1. Total War

The market economy involves peaceful cooperation. The division of labor cannot function effectively amidst a war. Warfare among primitive tribes did not suffer this drawback because the warring parties had not been engaged in a trade before the hostilities. Thus they engaged in total war.

The Economics of War-2

By David Friedman

"The science of war is moving live men like blocks."
Stephen Vincent Benet
John Brown's Body

To most non-economists, economics has something to do with money, and the economics of war presumably has to do with how we pay for the bombs and bullets. Economists have different and broader ideas of what their field is; my own favorite definition is that economics is that approach to understanding human behavior which starts from the assumption that individuals have objectives and tend to choose the correct way to achieve them. From this standpoint, the potential subject matter is all of the human behavior (some of my colleagues would include animal behavior as well) and the only test of whether the behavior is or is not economic is the ability of our basic assumption to explain or predict it.

Kautilya’s Saptang :Theory of State

Saptanga Theory which has been mentioned in Arthashastra includes all the seven organs of the state which has been separately elaborated among the various volumes of Arthashastra

Saptanga Theory which has been mentioned in Arthashastra includes all the seven organs of the state which has been separately elaborated among the various volumes of Arthashastra. It explains the role of the king who has been treated as the life of the state and who shall be the defender of Dharma, who is supposed to be Dharmic, enthusiastic, powerful, aggressive, decisive, fearless and free from self-indulgence.



Gandhi on Nonviolence, 1920

Gandhi on Nonviolence, 1920

In his leadership of the great national liberation struggle of India against British imperialism, Gandhi established the methodology of nonviolence, which is essential to a culture of peace. To Gandhi, there must be no enemy - only an adversary or opponent who has not yet been convinced of the truth.

Machiavelli - Renaissance of Art of war

Machiavelli - Renaissance of Art of war

Summary

Machiavelli's philosophy is based on his pessimistic view of human nature. He has been called a "pagan Augustinian". Aristotle and Plato also called attention to the imperfect nature of man, but Machiavelli rejected their approach. He follows Xenophon more closely. It was Xenophon who took a rational organization, the army and applied the lessons learned in its construction and operation to the problems of society in general. Machiavelli follows his lead in linking military and civil societies.


SunTzu : Art of War

Lenin :Guerrilla Warfare



Source: Marxist Internet Archive

Also Read: Guerrilla Warfare' s Meaning and Origin



Guerrilla Warfare


Engagement in or the activities involved in a war fought by small groups of irregular soldiers against typically larger regular forces
Definition
Engagement in or the activities involved in a war fought by small groups of irregular soldiers against typically larger regular forces.Guerrilla warfare is a form of irregular warfare in which a small group of combatants, such as paramilitary personnel, armed civilians, or irregulars, use military tactics including ambushes, sabotage, raids, petty warfare, hit-and-run tactics, and mobility to fight a larger and less-mobile traditional military.